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Stability of Coalition Structures 
and Imputations in Coalition-Games 
MILAN MARES 
In the presented paper a model of bargaining in coalition-games is suggested. The main goal 
of the work is to present a simple and easy to survey method, which could be algorithmized in 
a sufficient degree. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the present time, there exist a few models of the bargaining in coalition-games 
with side-payments. Most of them are devoted to the problem of final distribution 
of the common pay-off. Such models usually investigate properties of the core (e.g. 
[4], [5], and many others), or introduce certain vectors of final profits, having some 
equilibrium properties (e.g. [2]). 
More interesting from the point of view of this paper, are such models, which 
describe not only the final pay-offs, given in some units of transferable utility, but 
also.the final "state of the bargaining", i.e. the final coalitions, together with the 
inner distributions of their profit. The most famous of them is the Aumann's and 
Maschler's paper [ l ] , which gives a very illustrative model of bargaining. Author 
of the presented paper suggested a modification of this method in [3]. The Aumann's 
and Maschler's method can cause certain difficulties, namely when we want to find 
out the existence of some contraobjections to any objection against given con-
figuration. 
The main idea if the presented paper is that the procedure of finding of the resulting 
configuration may be simplified, if we find firstly the coalition structures, which may 
appear in the result of bargaining, and then we construct the imputations, which 
correspond to this coalition structures. 
The aim of this paper is to describe such a procedure, which would be simple 
enough, which could be algorithmized, and which would not contradict the common 
intuitive idea about the rational result of bargaining in a conflict situation, or the 
classical concepts of the core. 
The suggested method is described in sections 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 of this paper. The 
other parts are devoted to introductory notions (parts 1 and 2), to some special 
situations, which may occur in the coalition-game and which enable us to simplify 
the procedure (sections 6, 7 and 10), and to certain correspondence between the 
described method and a classical concept of the game theory, namely the core (sec-
tion 11). 
1. COALITION-GAME 
First of all we specify two notions, known from the elementary set theory. 
If A is some non-empty and finite set then the family Ji of non-empty subsets 
of A is called a partition of A, iff 
U M = A, 
MeM 
and for any K, Le J4 is K n L = 0. 
If Ji and Jf are two partitions of the same set A, then Ji is called a subpartition 
of Jf iff for any M e Ji there exists N e Jf such that M <= N. 
The coalition-game is a conflict situation, in which its participants, players, are 
allowed to collaborate in admissible coalitions, and for any coalition its guaranteed 
final common pay-off is known. This pay-off can be arbitrarily distributed among 
members of the coalition. 
Let J be a finite and non-empty set. 
Let K be a non-empty class of the partitions of the set J, such that for any class 
M c K and for any family Jf of subsets of J, where 
Jf <= U Ji, and Jf" is a partition of J, 
MeM 
also J f e K. 
Let, finally, v be a superadditive set function, defined on the family of subsets of I 
U Jf 
XeK 
(1.1) v(K) + v(L) ̂  v(K u L) , K,L,KyjLe\jyf, KnL = 
XeK 
Then the triple 
T = (7, K, v) 
is called a coalition-game. 
Elements of the set J are called players, partitions of I, belonging to the class K 
are coalition structures, the subsets of/, belonging to the family 
are called coalitions, and the set function v is the characteristic function of the 
game T. 
2. IMPUTATIONS AND CONFIGURATIONS 
Let r = (/, K, v) be a coalition-game. It was already said in the previous section 
that the common profit v(K) of any coalition K can be arbitrarily distributed among 
its members. The concept of imputation represents such possible distribution of pay-
off. 
Let n be the number of players in the set /. We define for any coalition structure 
l e K the subset X(Jf) of n-dimensional Euclidian space, 
(2.1) X(Jf) = {x = (x,)fe/ : £ xt = v(K) for any K e Jf} . 
ieK 
Any n-dimensional vector x e X(jf) is called an imputation in Jf. It is obvious 
that X(jf) is (n - /c)-dimensional subspace of the n-dimensional Euclidian space, 
where n is number of elements in /, and k is number of coalitions in Jf. 
If Jf e K and x e X(jf) then the pair (.Jf, x) is called a configuration in the given 
coalition-game T. 
3. RATIONALITY AND EFFECTIVITY 
The concept of rationality is a basic one in the coalition-games theory. It is well-
-known from the literature, e.g. from [ l ] , and it must not be omitted, whenever the 
configurations in colition-game are investigated. For our purposes, when the 
coalition structures and the imputations are considered separately, the rationality 
may be restricted to the effectivity from below, defined in this section. The effectivity 
from above, defined also in this section, enables us, in the final steps of our bargaining 
investigation, to eliminate some results of bargaining, in which the cooperation 
among players is not as strong as possible. 
Definition 1. The configuration (jf, x) is said to be rational, iff for all coalition 
structures / e K such that^/ is a subpartition of Jf", the inequality 
(3.1) 40 ^£*. 
ieJ 
is true for all J ef. 
Definition 2. Let Jf e K be a coalition structure. Then we say that 
Jf is effective from below, iff there exists an imputation x e X(jf) such that 
(Jf\ x) is rational; 
.yff' is effective from above, iff for any if effective from below and such that Jf 
is a subpartition of if, the equation 
(3.2) IK*) = !-<-.) 
Ke^ f X.e.S? 
is true; 
,"/f is effective, iff it is effective from below and effective from above. 
The classes of configurations being effective from below, effective from above, and 
effective, will be benoted by symbols 
Kef, K
ef and Kef, 
respectively. 
Remark 3.1. It is obvious that Kef = Kcf n K
ef. 
Remark 3.2. Let ,5T e K. It is an immediate consequence of the previous Definitions 
that Jf e Kef iff there exists xeX(jf), x = (x,),rf, such that for any / e K , where / 
is a subpartition of Jf, and for all J e „/ the following inequality holds 
I*.* "(f)-
ieJ 
Lemma 3.1. There exists at least one effective coalition structure in any coalition-
game; i.e. Kcf #= 0. 
Proof . The class Kef is always non-empty, because it contains at least the coalition 
structures from K, for which no their subpartition in K exists. On the other hand, 
the finite, non-empty class Kef contains at least one coalition structure if, such that 
for any X e Kef, S£ is not a subpartition of X. Consequently, 
^eKc!n K
ef = K?r. 
The following statements of this section describe some relations between a coali-
tion structure and its subpartition, namely, if they both are effective. The obtained 
results will be applied in the 6th section, and, partially, also in the 10th section 
of this work, where they enable us to simplify the construction of the bargaining 
solution in some coalition-games. 
Lemma 3.2. Let JT e K, i f e Kcf, j f is a subpartition of S£, and let 
(3.3) I<K) = 2>(L). 
Then Jf 6 Kef and X(tf~) c X(i£). 
Proof. Because X is a subpartition of £f, the relations (3.3) and (1.1) imply that 465 
v(L) = X v(K), for all L e £f . 
Ke.f,r ,K<^L 
It means that X(X) c X(£f). Let j f <£ Kef. Then, by Remark 3.2, for any x e X(:/C) 
there exists f e K and i e / such that / is a subpartition of Jf (and of if), and 
I*,- < K-7)-
ieJ 
Consequently, also (£f, x) is not rational for any x eX(X) <= X(£f). On the other 
hand, (3.3) and (2.1) imply that for any y e X(£f) - X(X) there exists K e X', such 
that 
v(K) > X y, . 
ieK 
Because .if is a subpartition of £f, also no configuration (£f, y), where y e X(£f) — 
— X(X) is rational. It means that X £ Kc( implies £f £ Kcf, what contradicts the 
assumptions of Lemma. 
Lemma 3.3. Let / e Kcf, :/f e K, and let / be a subpartition of :'/f. Then :/f e Kef. 
Proof. If :/C $ Kcf then there exists Jl e Kef such that Jf is a subpartition of .// 
and 
(3.4) I v(M) > X v(K) £ I v(J), 
Ms. it Ks.r Jef 
where the last inequality follows from (1.1) and from the assumption that f is 
a subpartition of X. As f is also a subpartition of Jf, the relation (3.4) implies 
that jf 4 Kef, what contradicts the assumptions of Lemma. 
Corollary Let / 6 Kef, £f e Kef, X e K, and let / be a subpartition of :/f and X 
be a subpartition of £f. Then 
/ e K e f , J e K ; | , £feKet\, 
as follows from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. 
Lemma 3.4. Let Jf e Kef, Sf e K
ef and let X be a subpartition of if. Then 
(3.5) v(L) = Y. "(*•), f o r a i l Le£f, 
KeX.K^L 
(3.6) X(if) z> X(JT), 
and if for some imputation x e X(£f) the configuration (£f, x) is rational, then 
x eX( j f ) and (X, x) is rational. 
466 Proof . The equation (3.5) is an immediate consequence of (3.2) and (1.1) and of 
the assumption that JT is a subpartition of ££. Let x eX( j f ) . Then, by (3.5) and (2.1), 
also xeX(££). Let, on the other hand, x eX(££), and (££, x) be rational. Then, by 
Definition 1, 
I *i Z v(K) 
ieK 
for all K e ,if, as JT is a subpartition of ££. This inequality, and the equality 
(3.5) imply, that 
£ x ; = v(K) for all K e ,5f , 
teK 
and, consequently, x e J ^ J f ) . If (jf,x) is not rational, then there exists / e K , 
such that f is a subpartition of j f and 
(3.7) «(J) < £ x ; for some J e / . 
But, (3.7) contradicts the assumption of rationality of (££. x), because f is also 
a subpartition of ££. It means that (X, x) is rational. 
4. SAFE COALITION STRUCTURES 
This section of the presented paper includes some auxiliary relations on the class 
K of all admissible coalition structures. Our aim in this section is to define, under 
which assumptions a given coalition structure can be endangered by some group 
of other coalition structures, and when it has a possibility to stave off this endanger-
ment. 
Definition 3. Let Jf e K, and let M c Kef be a class of coalition structures. Then 
we say that ,>f is safety against M and we write Jf" a M iff there exists x e X(X) 
such that (jf, x) is rational configuration, and 
X Xi ^ v(M) for all M e\) Jl. 
ieM JteM 
If X is not safety against some class M c Kef, then we write :%£. non a M. 
Remark 4.1. 
1. if JT e K, M c Kef, then exactly one of the relations .5f a M and JT non a M 
is true; 
2. if Jf' e K - Kef then there exists JT e Kef such that .?f' non a {,;f}; 
3. if Jf e K, M c N c Kef, then j f a N implies Jf a M; 
4. if (ju ...,j„) is an arbitrary permutation of indices .(1, ..., «), if J f e K and 
{ j r . , . . . , Jf,,} <=• Kef, then 
Jf cr {jf j , ..., J f „} if and only if 
J f a { j f , , , . . . , . # • , , } ; 
5. if j f e K, M <= Kef, / e M, then 
Jf a M if and only if Jf a (M u {/}), and 
.Jf cr M if and only if Jf cr (M u {Jf}). 
Lemma 4.1. Let Jf e K, and let O c: Kcf be the empty class of coalition structures. 
Then Jf a O if and only if Jf e Kef. 
Proof. By Definition 3, Jf cr O if and only if there exists xeX(jf) such that 
(Jf, x) is rational. This is equivalent with the effectivity from below of Jf. 
Now, when the auxiliary relation was introduced, we can investigate the gradual 
mutations of coalition structures, during the bargaining process. 
5. STABILITY OF COALITION STRUCTURES 
In this part a method is given, which enables us to define the bargaining solu-
tion on the class of coalition structures. It enables us to find out the resulting struc-
tures. The following Definition 4 describes, which coalition structures can break 
a formed coalitions. 
Generally, the coalition structures, which appear during the bargaining process, 
can be broken and substituted by some other ones. Some of them are able to reappear, 
sooner or later, after any such removal. This ability may be understood as certain 
kind of dynamic stability. The strongest possible state of the bargaining is such, in 
which the formed coalition structure can not be substituted by any other coalition 
structure. Both cases of stability, the strong one and the dynamic one, are investigated 
in this section, and, for some special cases of coalition structures, also in following 
two parts of this paper. 
Definition 4. A mapping A from K into the family of subclasses of the class Kef. 
such that for any Jf e K 
(5.1) A(X) = {Jt e Kef: for some M c Kef Jf a M and Jf non a (M u {.yg})} 
is called a domination structure in the game r. 
Remark 5.1. The previous Definition implies immediately that for any . f e K 
is A(J€) C Kef, and for any , f E K - K\\ is A(jf) * 0. 
Lemma 5.1. Let Jf e K. Then A(i€) = 0 if and only if Jf a Kef. 
468 Proof . It is an immediate consequence of Definition 4 that A(X) = 0 if and 
only if X CT M for all M a Kef. It means that the implication A(jf) = 0 => X a Kef 
is true. On the other hand, if Jf a Kef, then, by Remark 4.1 (statement 3), also 
Jf rj M for any M <= Kef, and J(;T) = 0. 
Corollary. Let Jf e K Then zl(jf) = 0 if and only if there exists x e -X'(Jf) such 
that 
X A-,- ^ »(/_) for all K e (J -? • 
/EK .JfsK.f 
After this introduction of the domination structure and its elementary properties, 
we are going to investigate the stability of coalition structures. In the following 
Definition we introduce the general concept of stability, which has dynamic character. 
Definition 5. Let J f e K. We say that JJf is stable, iff for any set {jf \, ..., Jf„} cz Ktl 
such that 
XxeA(X), XreA(Xr_x), r = 2, .... n, 
there exists a set {_?,, ..., Sfm} c Kef such that 
if, e _.(_r„), Sfs e A(Sfs-,), s = 2, ..., m , Jf e A(Sfm) . 
The symbol S denotes the class of all stable coalition structures in the given game. 
Remark 5.2. It is an immediate consequence of the previous Definition and of 
Remark 5.1 that 
S cz KQf, 
A(zf) = 0 » X e S , for any JT e K . 
The just defined stability of coalition structures can be interpreted as the "dynamic 
stability", mentioned in the introductory paragraphs of this section. It is obvious 
that the "strong stability", mentioned also in the introductory paragraphs, was 
already defined. This kind of stability is represented by the coalition structures, for 
which the value of domination structure is empty. By Remark 5.2, the "strong 
stability" is a special case of the "dynamic stability". Their further properties are 
described by the following statements. 
Lemma 5.2. Let Jf, Sf 6 K, ;'/f e S, and Sf e A(:X). Then Sf eS. 
Proof . If Sf 4 S then there exists a set {jf,, ..., Jf„} cz Kef such that 
(5.2) jfieA(Sf), J f r e_ . (_# ,_ , ) , /• = 2, . . . , / / , 
and there is no set {jf„+i, •••,X„,} c KCf
 such t h a t 
(5.3) XreA(Xr^), r = n + \,...,m, SfeA(Xm). 
It means that there exists a set {if, Jf l 5 . . . , Jf„} such that if e .d(jf) and (5.2) is true, 469 
and there is no {jf„+ 1 , ..., Jfm} such that (5.3) would be true and .'/f e A(c€m). 
Hence, ,/f $ S, what contradicts the assumptions of Lemma. 
Lemma 5.3. Let :/f, i£ e K, X e A(£C), A(.Yf) = 0. Then if $ S. 
Proof. AsA(:/f) = 0, there does not exist any set {jfu ..., Jf„} in Kef, j f , e A(,yf), 
:/fr e <d(jfr_,), r = 2, ..., n, i f e /d(Jf„). 
Lemma 5.4. Let / , Jf 6 Kef, and let 
(5.4) Y>(K) > £ - ( . / ) . 
KeJf J~e/ 
ThenJf e z l ( / ) . 
Proof. For any x e l ( / ) there exists K e :£ such that 
v(K) > £ x;. 
ieK 
Consequently, / non a {.%'}, and by Lemma 4.1, / a O, where O is empty class 
of coalition structures. It means that Jf" 6 A(f). 
Corollary. If / , :/( e Kef, A(jf) = 0, and (5.4) is true, then f $ S, as follows 
from Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4. 
Lemma 5.5. Let ,Jf e K, A(.Jf) = 0. Then 
V V(K) = max { £ v(J): / e Kef} = max { Y v(J): / 6 Kef) . 
A'eJf Jsjf 7e / 
Proof. By the previous Lemma 5.4, A(:/f) = 0 implies that for all / e Kef the 
relation (5.4) is true. It is an immediate consequence of Definition 2 that 
max { X v(J): / e Kef
f} = max { I u(J): / e Kef} . 
Jtf Jef 
Corollary. If A(Ji) = 0 for some Ji e K then for any ,/f e S is 
X v(K) = max { Y_ »(j) : / e Kcf} , 
Ke.* J e / 
as follows from Lemmas 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. 
Theorem 5.1. There exists at least one effective and stable coalition structure in any 
coalition-game; i.e. 
SnKl{ * 0. 
470 Proof . Let us introduce a binary relation 8 on the class K in the following way: 
For any X, X' G K we write 
X8 X' 
iff there exists a set {X, , / „ } <= Kef such that 
XxeA{X'), XreA{Xr-i), r = 2, ...,«, XeA{X„) 
and there is no set {jSf,, ..., ,£f„,} c Kef such that 
JS?,e .d(j f ) , JSP.e J ( .S?. - i ) , s = 2, . . . , m , J T e/.(.S?,,.) . 
Such relation 8 is a partial ordering on the finite set K, and it is antisymetrical, anti-
reflexive, and transitive. Consequently, there exists at least one maximal element 
in K, according to the partial ordering 8, and any coalition structure is maximal 
according to 8, if and only if it is stable, i.e. 
S = {.// 6 K ; Jt is maximal element in K according to 8} c Kef, 
Let us choose X e S. If Jt is effective, then the desired stable and effective coalition 
structure is found. If Jt e Kef — K
ef then there exists, by Lemma 5.4 and by Defini-
tion 2, at least one 
JT e Kll( n «4(UJT) . 
By Lemma 5.1, also Jf e S, and in this case, ,/V is the desired coalition structure. 
Theorem 5.2. If there exists at least one coalition structure X e K with empty 
value of domination structure A, then the domination structure is empty for all, 
and exactly all, stable coalition structures; in symbols, if A{X) = 0 for some X e K, 
then 
S = {JteK: A(Jt) = 0} . 
Proof. Let A(X) = 0. Then, by Lemma 5.1, X a Kef. It means that there exists 
xeX{X) such that 
(5.5) X Xi ^ v{J) for all J e {M : M e Jt, Jt e Kef} . 
ieJ 
If Jt e S then, by Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5, 
X v{M) = I v{K) = X x., 
MeJl KeJf iel 
as X $ A(Ji), by Lemma 5.3. Moreover, (5.5) implies that 
X x ; ^ v{M) for all M e Jt, Jt e S , 
ieM 
so that 
X x, = v(M) for all M eJ/,JteS. 
ieM 
Consequently, x e X(Ji), and, because of (5.5), A(Jl) = 0 for all Jt e S, by Lemma 
5.3 and its Corollary. On the other hand, if A(S£) = 0 for some ££ e K then SC e S 
(c.f. Remark 5.2). 
The just proved Theorem 5.2 provokes a question, whether the class S is different 
from Kef (or Kef), when A(X) ± 0 for all Jf e K. If it were so, then it would have 
no sense to define S as a special notion, and we could operate with the classes Kef 
and {jf e K : A(jf) = 0} only. The following Example shows that S is generally 
different from Kef even from Kef
f. 
Example. Let F = (I, K, v) be a coalition-game. Let / = {l, 2, 3, 4}, K containes all a priori 
possible partitions of the set /, and v be the following one: 
v({/}) = v({/,/}) = 0 for all ij el, / 4= / , 
v({/,y, k}) = v(l) = 1 for all ij, k e /, i =j= j 4= A: ± i . 
We denote the coalition structures 
•*-. = {{l}.{2},{3},{4}} JT9 = {{3], {1,2}, {4}} 
. ^ 2 = { { 1 } , { 2 , 3 } , { 4 } } , T 1 0 = { { 3 ] , { I , 2 , 4 } } 
j r 3 = { { l } , { 2 } , { 3 , 4 } } . ^ n = {{4},{l ,2 ,3}} 
JT4= {{.],{3},{2,4}} Jr i 2 = {{l,2},{3,4}] 
. ^ • 5 = { { 1 ] , { 2 , 3 , 4 } } JT 1 3 = { { 1 , 3 } , {2, 4}} 
JT6 = {{2}, {l , 3}, {4}} J r i 4 = { { l , 4 } , { 2 , 3 } } 
j r 7 = { { 2 } , { . , 4 } , { 3 } } J T 1 5 = {{1,2,3 ,4}} 
J T 8 = { { 2 } , { 1 , 3 , 4 } } 
Then it can be simply verified, that 
K e f = K - { j T 1 5 } , 
Kcf = {"Tj' J 8> "''"lO' ^ l l - ^ 1 2 ' ̂ 1 3 ' r i 4 } • 
X*s) = { - * V ^ , o , • * , . } . 
A(.rH) = { j r 5 , j r 1 0 , j r 1 1 } > 
4(jr ,o)= { j r 5 , j r 8 , j r n } , 
J ( j r u ) = { j r 5 , j r 8 , j r 1 0 } , 
^(JT1 2 ) = J ( J T 1 3 ) = J ( J T 1 4 ) = { j r 5 , j r 8 , j r 1 0 , j r n } . 
Consequently, A(.X) 4= 0 for all JT e K, and 
S = { J T 5 , J T 8 , JT1 0 , J T n } 4= Kcf ± Kef 4= S . 
472 it is possible to introduce some further properties of the class S, namely some 
relations between S and Kef — S. 
Theorem 5.3. Let S be the class of stable coalition structures, let Kef 4= S, and let 
a = min { X »(K) : •#" £ S} , \i = max { £ i>(K) : Jf e Kef - S} . 
XEJT KejT 
Then 
« «£ /?• 
Proof. Lemma 5.4 implies that for jf e S and i " e Kef, for which 
also i ^ e S . It means that 
P = I »(K) 
KeJT 
for all ,5f e S and, consequently, a S: /i. 
Theorem 5.4. Let J be such a partition of the set /, that for any Jf e K, . / is 
a subpartition of Jf. If J is admissible coalition structure, J e K, then 
/,(./) = { l o / £ S « / e K e f , 
and if J f e K is such that 
I »(/) = X ,(K) 
then :/£ is stable if an only if A(tf) = 0, and A(:/f) = 0 if and only if J g S. 
Proof . If J^ 6 Kef then for all J f e Kef is 
(5.6) 1-0/) = ! < / - ) , 
JE./ K6JT 
and for any x eX(J) is 
X X,- = D(K) for all K e [M : M e Jt, Jt e Kef} . 
ieK 
It means that J o Kef, and by Lemma 5.1, A(J) = 0. On the other hand, let J is not 
effective from above. Then, by Remark 5.1, there exists Jt e Kcff such that Jt e A(J). 
If <£ e Kef and M <= Kcf then the relation i f o M implies i f a (M u {J}), as for any 
x <BX(S£) such that (if, x) is rational-
][>. ;> v(J) for all JeJ, 
ieJ 
when . / is a subpartition of JT. Consequently, ./<£ .d(.Sf) for any i f e Kef. This 
implies that J $S, if J$Ktf. The implication /l(j*") = 0 = > / e S follows from 
Definition 5, or from Remark 5.2, immediately. We have already proved that 
J e S => J e Kef => zl(>) = 0 => / e S, what finishes the proof of the first statement 
of Theorem. Now, let J f s K and let (5.6) be true. Then X(J) c X(,?f). HJeS 
then A(J) = 0, and J a Kef, by Lemma 5.1. It means that the x e X(J), which fulfil 
the requirements of Definition 3 for the relation J a Kef, belong also to the set 
X(:JC), and they are sufficient even for the validity conditions of the relation Jf a Kef. 
Because Jf a Kef implies that A(.yf) = 0, we have proved 
(5.7) JeS=> A(jf) = 0 -> Jf e S . 
On the other hand, if J <£ S then, by the first statement of this Theorem, J $ Kcf; 
there exists JS? e Kef such that 
I KI-) > !*>(•!) = I KO, 
leSS JSJ> Jej r 
and, by Lemma 5.4, 3? e A(JF), A(.Jf) 4= 0. But, it is possible to prove, analogously 
to the method, used in the first part of this proof, that for any ./// e Kef, j f <£ A(Ji), 
so that Jf i S. Consequently, 
(5.8) J ^ S => A(X) * 0 => . r <£ S . 
The implications (5.7) and (5.8) imply the validity of the latter statement of the 
proved Theorem. 
In this section, we have introduced the class S, which contains all stable coalition 
structures, and which has properties, described in the previous statements. 
When we consider all possible transitions from one coalition structure to another 
one, during the bargaining process, we see that they can be distributed into two 
groups. 
One of them include? such situations, in which some coalitions in the original 
coalition structure were broken. These situations have, generally, rahter antago-
nistic character — they can come true against the interestes and wishes of some 
groups of players. They represent the real conflict in the bargaining process. 
The other group of transitions includes the situations, in which only some groups 
of small coalitions were unified into larger coalitions. Formally, some coalition 
structure from Kef — K
ef was substituted by another one from Kef. These transitions 
may be realized without lost of profit for any player, and with growth of profit for 
at least some of them. We may expect that they will be realized as soon as possible, 
and that the coalition structures, in which such transitions are possible, will not 
occur among the results of rational bargaining. 
It enables us to introduce the Bargaining Solution on the class of all coalition 
structures. 
The Bargaining Solution on the class of all coalition structures is the class of 
all stable and effective coalition structures in the given coalition-game. i.e. the class 
(5.9) SnKlff. 
We have proved in this section that the Bargaining Solution on the class of all 
coalition structures is always non-empty and that it is equal to the class 
{ j T e K : A(X) = 0} , 
if and only if that class is non-empty. 
Moreover, this Bargaining Solution on the class of all coalition structures is 
satisfactory also from the point of view of demands, which may be intuitevely putted 
on the properties of expected result of bargaining in coalition-games. 
6. EFFECTIVE SUBPARTITIONS 
This section is devoted to a special relation between coalition structures, namely 
to the relation between a coalition structure and its subpartition, if they both are 
effective. 
In the whole following section we suppose that 
(6.1) XeK%, <esK\\, and J f is a subpartition of S£ . 
This situation was already mentioned in Lemma 3.4, and the relation between 
a coalition structure and its subpartition, without the effectivity assumption, was 
investigated also in Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 If such a pair of coalition structures appears 
in some coalition-game, the procedure of finding out the Bargaining Solution on the 
class of all coalition structures can be simplified, namely if some of them belongs 
to the Solution. 
Lemma 6.1. Let (6.1) be fulfilled for some X, Se e K, and let M c Kef, Ji e K. 
Then 
Jt a (M u {jf}) -*. Ji a (M u {jf, S£}), 
Se CT M=> Jf a M, 
X CT (M u {if}) o Jf CT M , and 
Se CT (M u {X}) <=> Se CT M . 
Proof . Let Ji sK and Ji a (M u {jf}). Then, by Lemma 4.1, Ji e Kef, and 
there exists x e X(Ji) such that (Ji, x) is rational, and 
(6.2) Y> ; £ v(J) for all J e J f u f U / ) -
ieJ feM 
Hence, 
(6.3) £ x ; ^ v(K) for all K e Jf . 
By Lemma 3.4 and by (6.3), 
5 > . £ X v(K) = v(L) for all Le Sf . 
ieL Kutf.K^L 
Consequently, (6.2) is true also for all 
i e . f u f / u ( U / ) , 
and Ji a(Mu {jf, Sf}). 
The second statement, Se a M => J f a M, is an immediate consequence of Defi-
nition 3, assumption (6.1), and of the second part of Lemma 3.4. 
Let J f a M. Then there exists x e X(jf), for which the requirements of Definition 3 
are fulfilled. By Lemma 3.4, also 
y > ; = £ t>(JC) = u(L) for any Le Sf , 
isL fc/.Kcl 
and x is also the imputation, for which the conditions of the relation :£ a (M u {Sf}) 
are secured. The implication 
JT a M =• Jf a (M u {SC}) 
is proved and the opposite implication follows from Remark 4.1 (part 3). Let Sf a M, 
and let y e X(j2?) be the imputation, for which the requirements of Definition 3 for 
the relation Sf a M are fulfilled. Because of the rationality of (Sf, y) and of the 
validity of (6.1), 
;>>,• ^ v(K) for all K e X~, 
ieK 
it means that 
SfoM^>Sfo(Mv {.if}) => Sf a M, 
where the latter implication follows from Remark 4.1. 
Corollary. The last two statements of the previous Lemma imply that for any :ff 
and Sf satisfying (6.1) is 
X i A(Sf) and Sf $ A(jf). 
Lemma 6.2. Let Jf, Sf e K fulfil (6.1), let M <= Kef, and let 
J(Se) = { / e Kef : / is a subpartition of Sf} . 
Then i f aJ(Se), and i f a M o S£ a (J(Sf) u M) <*> j f a (J(SC) u M) . 
Proof . According to Remark 3.2, Sf e Kef iff there exitsts x e JV(jSf) such that 
J > , ^ r (J ) for all / e j ( ^ ) , J 6 / . 
Consequently, Sf e Kef implies Sf oJ(Sf). Let Sf o M. Then there exists xeX(Sf), 
such that (Sf, x) is rational, and 
(6.4) X xi = »(M) f o r a11 M e J^ ^eM. 
isM 
It is equivalent with the statement that (6.4) is true for all M e M u J(Sf), and that 
(6.5) Sfo(Mu J(Sf)). 
If (6.5) is true then, by Lemma 6.1, also 
(6.6) . r o (M u J(Sf)). 
The relation (6.6) means that there exists xeX(Jf) such that (jf, x) is rational, and 
(6.4) is true for all M e M u J(J?). Then, according to Lemma 3.4, is x e X(Sf) and 
(Sf, x) is also rational. It means that Sf o M. Summing up the proved implications, 
we obtain 
SSoM^ Sfo(M<u J(Sf)) => X a (Art U /(j§f)) => J? a /M . 
and the statement of Lemma is proved. 
Corollary. Let (6.1) be true for some Jf, Sf e K, let M <= Kcf, and let j ( if) = 
= {f e Kef: fl is a subpartition of Sf}. If :Yf o M and J? non cr A1 then there 
exists a class J <= /(JSf), J + 0, such that J f non a (M n J). 
Lemma 6.3. If for Jf, .Sf e K (6.1) is true then .d(.Jf) => A(Sf). 
Proof. Let Jt e A(Sf). It means that there exists M <= Kef, and 
(6.7) Sf o M and j§? non o (/Vl u {.//}). 
By Lemma 6.1, also X o M. If Jf non cr (M u {,///}) then J/e A(.Jf). If 
j f <j (M u {^}) and (6.7) is true then, by Lemma 6.2 and its Corollary, there 
exists J <= Kef, J 4= 0, such that 
(6.8) X non o ( M u j u {.//}). 
It is possible to choose J in such a way that,* = J(Sf). Then 
J f a ( - V l u j ) , 
and (6.8) is true. It means that Jt 6 A(X), and A(Sf) c /l(jf). 
Lemma 6.4. Let (6.1) be true for some X,S£ BK, and let Jl e K. Then Sf e A(J() 
implies j f e /d(.^). 
Proof. Let Jz? e A(Jt), and let M <= Kef be such tha t . / / a M and Jt non a (M u 477 
u {JS?}). Then Jt non a (M u {jf}), because 
./// a (M u {jf'}) => ./// a (M u {jf} u {JS?}) => Jt a (M u {JS?}) , 
according to Lemma 6A and Remark 4.1. Consequently, .Jf* e . 
Theorem 6.1. Let Jf, JS? e Kcf be effective coalition structures, and let Jf be 
a subpartition of jS?. Then J f is stable if JS? is stable, and the value of domination 
structure for :/f is empty if and only if the value of domination structure for J? is 
empty; in symbols, 
f£ e$=> Jf eS , 
A(S') = { ) o A(jf) = 0 . 
Proof. Before proving the statement of Theorem, we prove the following auxiliary 
property of non-rational configurations. 
Let x e X(f£), and let (JS?, x) be non-rational. Then there exists Jl e Kcf and 
M e Jt such that Jt is a subpartition of JS? and 
2>,.<„(M). 
ieM 
By Definition 1, we can choose / e K and J e £ such that £ is a subpartition 
of y, and 
L*. < "(I) • 
ieJ 
If,./ was chosen in such a way that J e Kcf then the problem is solved. Let £ e K — 
— Kcr. Then we can construct , /* e K such that J e t /* , , /* is a subpartition of £, 
and for any yK e K, where J e ./F, Jf is not a subpartition of £*. If / * <p Kef then 
we choose y e X ( / * ) such that v; > x,- for all i e J. As f* $ Kef, (_/*, y) is not 
rational, and we can repeat the described procrdure. It means that there exists 
J/" e K. and N e Jf such that Jf is a subpartition of / * and 
v(N) > X y,, 
ieiV 
where JV must be a subset of J. If Jf was chosen in such a way that Jf 6 Kef, then 
the problem is solved. If Jf e K — Kef, we repeat the described procedure as long 
as we necessarily reach, after finite number of steps, a coalition structure Jt e K 
and a coalition M e Jt such that M a N c J, Jt is a subpartition of yT (and 
of / , too), 
V(M) > I >'i > Z *.•. 
ieM ieAf 
and Jt is effective from below, Jt e Kef. 
The auxiliary statement is proved, and we may start the proof of the Theorem. 
Let S£ 6 S and let A(Sf) #= 0. Then there exists a set {Jtu ..., Jt„} a Kef such that 
Jit e A(Se) , Jtr e A(Jtr_t) , r = 2, ..., n . 
By Lemma 6.3, also Jtt e A(yf). Because SS eS, there exists a set {Jtn + 1, ..., Jtp} a 
c Kcf, such that 
Jtr e A(Jtr_^), r = n + 1, ..., p , See A(Jtp) . 
By Lemma 6.4 also JT e A(Jip). Let us consider an arbitrary set {JTU • • •> JTm} <= Kef 
such that 
(6.9) JTx<=A{pf), JrseA(Jrs_t), s = 2, ..., m. 
Then there may be constructed a set 
L = [se, Jtt,.:., Jt„, Jt„+t,..., Jtp, 3f, jru..., JTm} . 
Because Sf e S, the existence of the set L implies that there exists a set {JTm+l, ... 
..., JTq} c Kcf, such that 
jrseA(JTs-.t), s = m + l,...,q, Sf e A(JTq) . 
By Lemma 6.4, also JT e A(JTq). Because of the general validity of the previous 
consideration for all sets {JTU ..., JTm} a Kef with the property (6.9), the coalition 
structure JT is stable. This proved the first statement of the Theorem, for Sf e S, 
A(se) * 0. 
Let A(Se) = 0. Then Jz? CT Kcf, by Lemma 5.3, and Jf CT Kef, as follows from Lemma 
6.1. Hence, also A(JT) = <D,JTeS. 
Let A(c>r) = 0. Then J f CT Kef. It means that there exists x e X(Jf~) such that 
(jf, x) is rational, and 
(6.10) Y>; = v(J) for all J e [M : M e Jt, Jt e Ke(} . 
ieJ 
By Lemma 3.4, x e X(S£), and (6.10) is going on. It means that the relation Se CT Kcf 
is true, if (Sf, x) is rational. Let us suppose that (Sf, x) is non-rational. Then, by the 
auxiliary statement, proved in the first part of this proof, there exists Jt 6 Kef and 
MeJt such that 
2>.<»(M). 
ieM 
It is in contradiction with (6.10). Hence (SC, x) is rational, and SC CT Kef. Consequently, 
by Lemma 5.3, A(Se) = 0. 
Besides the just proved Theorem 6.1, we may use another methods for the verifica-
tion, whether j f and Sf, satisfying (6.1) are stable or not. The following Remarks 
represent two equivalent formulations of one such method. 
Remark 6.1. Let Jf, i f e K satisfy (6.1). If there exists J e S such that i f e . 
then also i f e S and Jf 6 S. If there exists JT e K - S such that JT e A(<£) then 
also $£ $S and J f £ S, as follows from Lemma 5.2. 
Remark 6.2. Let (6.1) be true for some Jf, i f 6 K. Let 
a = min { £ »(M) : . / / e S} , 
MeM 
P = max { £ »(M) : ^ e Kef - S} , 
At = Z "(--) = Z "CO (cf- Lemma 3.4). 
K s X Z-e-S? 
Then, by Theorem 5.3, \i > cc implies ^ e S and c€ e S, and \x < $ implies i f i£ S 
and Jf £ S. 
7. STRICTLY BOUNDED COOPERATION 
The bargaining model, and especially the Bargaining Solution on the class of all 
coalition structures, are very simple for a special kind of coalition-games. 
Let r = (I, K, v) be a coalition-game. We say that F is a game with strictly 
bounded cooperation, iff for any pair of coalition structures 3T, 5£ e K, j>T is a sub-
partition of if or i f is a subpartition of Jf. 
For such games Theorem 5.4 can be always applied, and, moreover, the following 
simple results can be obtained. 
Lemma 7.1. Let Jf e Kef be such that for any / e Kef is f a subpartition of Jf. 
Then A{Jt) = 0. 
Proof. It follows from Definition 2 that j f e Kef. The condition Jf e Kef means, 
by Remark 3.2, that there exists x e X ( j f ) such that for any f eK where / is 
a subpartition of X , and for any J e /", is 
»(•!) = £*.-• 
ieJ 
It means, by assumptions, that $T o Kef, and, by Lemma 5.3, A(jf) = 0. 
Theorem 7.1. In any game with strictly bounded cooperation always exists a co-
alition structure with empty value of its domination structure A. Moreover, in such 
games, any coalition structure is effective from below, and it is effective from above 
if and only if it is stable. In symbols, Kef = K, {JT e K : A(JT) = 0} * 0, 
(7.1) S = Kef = {jf : £ v(K) ^ £ v(j), for all / e K} = {jf e K : .4(jf) = 0} . 
Proof . Let Jfu jf2, ..., Jfm be all coalition structures in K, K = {jf f, ..., jiTm}, 
ordered in such a way that for any r = 1, . . . , m - 1 the coalition structures Jfr+1, ... 
..., Jf „, are subpartitions of Jfr, and there is no Jf e K which would be a subpartition 
of ,yfm. It is an immediate consequence of (1.1) that Jfr e Kef for all r = 1, ..., m. 
We define the sets 
Xr
r) = X(jf r) , 
X[r) = { x e X(jf r) : Y > ; S u(K) jor a/' X e U Jf p} , 
isK p = r 
for all r = 1, ..., m, s = r + 1, ..., m. The condition (l . l ) implies that A^r> =j= 0 
for all r and s. Consequently, by Remark 3.2, Jfr e Kef for r = 1, ..., m, and Kef = K. 
It follows from Definition 2 that j f , e K^. It implies that J f j a Kef, as X,
1 ' 4= 0. 
According to Lemma 5.3, A(jft) = 0. It implies, by Theorem 5.2, that S = {Jf e K : 
: A(jf) = 0}. If for some J f e X 
X t(K) < E »(K), 
then J T ^ K ^ , and .4(jT) # 0, as follows from Remark 5.1. By Lemma 5.2 also 
X i S. It means that (7.1) is proved. 
8. STABILITY OF CONFIGURATIONS 
The 5th section of this paper was devoted to the description of the Bargaining 
Solution on the class of all coalition structures, which was defined in the last para-
graphs of that section. The Bargaining Solution on the class of all coalition structures 
depends, by means of Definition 3, on the sets of imputations, corresponding to 
coalition structures. In this section we introduce some notions and statements, 
necessary for the description of general Bargaining Solution, including also the 
imputations, respectively the configurations. The concept of the general Bargaining 
Solution is specified and discussed in the next section and some its special properties 
are investigated also in the remaining sections of the presented work. 
It is obvious that even for the coalition structures, belonging to the Bargaining 
Solution on the class of all coalition structures, i.e. to the class 
some of their imputations are more suitable to act as a final result of bargaining, and 
some of their imputations are less suitable, or quite unconvenient to this purpose. 
Definition 6. We say that the configuration (JT, x), Jf e K, x e X(jT), is stable, iff 
.yfeKtftnS, 
(Jf, x) is rational, 
if 
£ Xj < »(M) for some M e {J : J e / , / e Kef} 
then there exists ..# e zl(jf) such that M e *.//. 
Theorem 8.1. If Jf is a stable and effective coalition structure, i.e. 
, f e S n K : [ , 
then there exists an imputation x e l ( j f ) such that the configuration (jf, x) is 
stable. 
Proof . Let X be an arbitrary, fixed coalition structure from S, where S 4= 0 
by Theorem 5.1. Let us denote for any M cz Kef the set of imputations 
YM(.yf) = {x e X(.yf) : (:£, x) is rational, and £ x ; ^ »(K) 
/o r o/Z Ke{M : Me Jt, Jl e M}} . 
It is an immediate consequence of Definition 3 that 
YM(.r) 4= 0 <* .JtT u M , 
and that 
YMU) + 0 
for at least one M c Kef (e.g. for empty class), because . f e S c Kef (c.f. Remark 
5.2). Let us choose some J? e Kef and A4 c Kcf, such that 
- M ( * 1 * 0 . 
Then 
W / » 0 * 1 <= YM(3T) . 
If 
then / e «4(jf), and f e S, by Lemma 5.4. 
There are two possibilities for the coalition structure Jf. Either 
YM(jf) * 0 even for M = Kef, 
or there exists L c Kef such that 
YL(jf) = 0 . 
In the former case zJ(jf) = 0, by Lemma 5.1, and (X, x) is obviously stable for any 
* 6 i U ^ ) • 
4 8 2 In the latter case we can choose at least one (but, generally, not only one) class 
M c Kef, for which 
YM(JT)*Q, 
and 
^ u ( / ) ) W = 0 for any / e Kef - M . 
It means that for any f e Kef — M is f e A(jf), and, consequently, for any 
x e YM(jf) #= 0 
the configuration (jf, x) fulfills the last two conditions of Definition 3. Because 
of the general validity of the previous consideration for all Jf e S, it is also true for 
all coalition structures being stable and effective. Consequently, for any 
jTeSn Klff 
there exists x e X(jf) such that the configuration (jf, x) is stable. 
We shall introduce a new symbol. For any Jf e Kv/e denote the set of imputations 
(8.1) X*(jf) = {xeX(.Jf) : (jf, x) is stable} . 
Remark 8.1. It is an immediate consequence of Definition 6 and the previous 
Theorem 8.1 that for any j f e K 
X*(jf) 4= 0 o X e S n K\\, 
and consequently, 
(8.2) U X*(jf) = U X*(jf) = U X*(jf) = U X*(X) . 
tfeK X-eS XSKcr'1 JfeSnK^ct 
Remark 8.2. Definitions 1 and 6 imply that for any JT e S n Kef 
(8.3) X*( . r ) = {x e X(JT) : £ Xi £ t<K) /o r A// K e 9T(jf)} , 
where 
(8.4) 9t(X) = {K : K e J? e Kef => if e Kef - A(JT)} ,U 
u {J : J e / ' / o r some / E K , / is a subpartition of J f} . 
Lemma 8.1. The set X*(jf) is convex for any JT e K. 
Proof . Let J f e K, let k be the number of elements (coalitions) in Jf, and let n 
be the number of all players on the set J. Then X(jf) is an (n — /c)-dimensional 
subspace of the n-dimensional Euclidian space (c.f. Section 2). If j f £ S n K|f then 
X*(jf ) is empty. If j f e S fl Kll> t h e n 
-Y*(jf) = {x e X(Jf) : X *i ^ »(.K)jor a/7 K s 9I(jf)} . 
ieK 
where 9l(Jf) is given by (8.4). It means that X*(jf) is a subset of the Euclidian sub-
space X(M'), restricted by finite many linear inequalities. Consequently, it is a convex 
subset of X{3t). 
Lemma 8.2. If the coalition structure jf0 = {{i}}ieI, containing exactly all one-
element coalitions, is admissible in the considered game F = (/, K, v), i.e. if J f 0 e K, 
then for any JT e K the set X*(jf) is a compact convex subset of an Euclidian space. 
Proof . For any Jf £ S n K^, the set X*(X) is empty, and for any X eS c\ K* 
the set X*(jf) is given by (8.3) and (8.4). For all iel the coalition {i} e 3t(jf") 
(c.f. (8.4)). Hence, X*(X) is a bounded subset of (n — fc)-dimensional subspace 
X(.yf) of the M-dimensional Euclidian space, (where n is the number of players in / 
and k is the number of coalitions in X), restricted by finite many linear inequalities, 
among which are also the inequalities 
xt ^ v({i}) for all iel. 
Moreover, the form of inequalities implies that the set X*(X) is closed (as the in-
equalities are not strict). Consequently, X*(jf) is a compact and covex subset of X(jf). 
Lemma 8.2. Let X, & e K be such that A(jf) = A(S£) = 0. Then 
X*(jf) = X*(<£). 
Proof . By Lemma 5.5, 
Zv(K) = Z<L). 
K e f LE¥ 
Lemma 5.1 implies that X a Kef and Se a Kef. Let x e X*(.%~). Then 
(8.5) £ x ; ^ i>(J) for all J e {M : M e J/, Jt e Kef} . 
ieJ 
It means that also 
X X; = r(L) for all L e S£ , 
ieL 
and, consequently, 
(8.6) £ > = »(L) for all L e i f , 
since 
AєJГ iє í JLєÄ1 iєL Lєi? 
484 The equality (8.6) implies that xeX(Se), and, as (8.5) is true, also xeX*(^). 
Hence, x e X*(X) implies x e X*(^£). The same procedure proves that x e X%$?) 
implies x e X*(X). 
Theorem 8.2. If there exists at least one coalition structure X with empty value 
of domination structure, A(X) = 0, then 
(8.7) U X*(J() = U X*(Ji) = 0 X*(Ji) = X*(X) 
JleK JteSnKer't JteS 
for all X e K, and the set (8.7) is a convex set. 
If for allXeK is A(X) 4= 0 then the set 
U x*(x) 
XeK 
is a union of finite many convex sets. 
Proof . Let X, i f e K and let A(X) = A(Sf) = 0. Then, by Lemma 8.3, X*(X) = 
= X*(£e). Let us denote 
6 = {X :XeK,A(X) = 0} . 
According to Theorem 5.2 and Remark 5.1, 
(8.8) B = 5nKl\ = SoB + <D. 
Consequently, 
(8.9) U X*(J?) = U X*(J/) = D X*(Ji) = X*(X) 
JleK JleB JleB 
for all X 6 S = 8 . 
The relations (8.8) and (8.9) prove the relation (8.7). Lemma 8.1 implies that the set 
(8.9) is a convex set. If 8 = 0 then the set 
U x*(x) 
KeK 
is a union of finite many sets X*(X), which are convex, by Lemma 8.1. 
Corollary. Let the coalition structure X0 = {{i}};eJ, belongs to the class K, and 




is a union of finite many convex compact sets in n-dimensional Euclidian space; if, 
moreover, there exists X e K with A(jf) = 0 then the set 
U x*(:/{) = n x*(,yc) 
XeK X~eS 
is a convex compact set in n-dimensional Euclidian space. 
Remark 8.3. If {:/f : Jf e K. A(.£) = 0} * 0 then the set 
U X*(jf) = n X*(,yf) 
J T S K JfeS 
is a subset of (n — /.(-dimensional subspace of ^-dimensional Euclidian space, 
where n is the number of players in J, and X is the number of coalitions in the set 
{L: L € Se, Se e K, A(&) = 0}, as follows from (8.6) for all £?eS,Le &. 
We have specified the properties of imputations, which may occur among possible 
results of bargaining, and we are able to formulate the complete and general Bargaining 
Solution. 
9. THE BARGAINING SOLUTION 
The concept of the Bargaining Solution on the class of all coalition structures 
was already introduced in the 5th Section of this paper. Now, we are going to for-
mulate the general Bargaining Solution of the coalition-game, i.e. the Bargaining 
Solution on the set of all admissible configurations. 
We say that the configuration (.5f, x), ,/f e K, x e X(,tfr), belongs to the Bargaining 
Solution of the coalition-game 
r = (j, K, v) 
if and only if (ct, x) is stable in the sense of Definition 6. 
It is obvious that the Bargaining Solution, defined in this way, corresponds with 
the intuitive idea of an expected bargaining result. The configuration (jf, x) belongs 
to the Bargaining Solution, if the coalition structure Jf belongs to the Bargaining 
Solution on the class of all coalition structures K, if (jT, x) is rational, and if it can 
not be broken by any coalition structure (with its imputations) which does not 
belong to the value of the domination structure A for Jf\ According to Lemma 5.2, 
the last condition means that the configuration (jf, x), belonging to the Bargaining 
Solution, can not be broken by any coalition structure, which is not stable in the 
sense of Definition 5. 
486 10. SOME SPECIAL CASES 
The following section contains some special formulations of the general results, 
obtained in the 8th Section, which correspond with the special situations in coalition-
-games with strictly bounded cooperation and in games with effective subpartitions 
of effective coalition structures. 
The coalition-games, in which effective subpartitions of effective coalition struc-
tures exist, were investigated in Section 6. The following Theorem describes the 
properties of sets X*(SC) and X*(.yf) (c.f. (8.1)), if X and 2 fulfil the condition (6.1). 
Theorem 10.1. Let Jf, Se e Kef be effective coalition structures, such thai X is 
a subpartition of S£. Then any imputation x forms a stable configuration with Jf, 
if it forms a stable configuration with S£; in symbols 
x*(se) c x*(yr). 
Proof . Theorem 6.1 implies that 
SeeSnKl[f=>Jf6SnKff. 
Consequently, if X*(Se) + 0 then X*(X~) * 0, and 
X*(jf) = {x 6 X(.yf) : £ xt § v(M) for all M e 2t(jf)} , 
ieM 
X*(Se) = {x e X(Se) : £ x, ^ v(M) for all M e %(se)} , 
ieM 
where 
9I(jf) = {J : J e / e Kef => / e Kef - J ( j f )} u 
u {J : J e / j o r some / e K, f is a subpartition of j f } , 
2I(J?0 = {J : J 6 / e Kef => / e Kef - zl(if)} u 
u {J : ./ e / j o r some / e K, / is a subpartition of S£} , 
(c.f. Remark 8.2). 
Because j f is a subpartition of if, 
{J : J e / for some / e K, / is a subpartition of'jf} c 
c {J : J e / j o r some / e K, / is a subpartition of S£} , 
and 
{J : J e / e Kef => / 6 Kef - J ( X ) } c 
c{J:JefeKef^>feKc[- A(SC)} , 
because Lemma 6.3 implies that 
Kef - A(&) => Kef - A(X). 
It means that 
W(Se) => 2I(JT), 
and, consequently, 
X*(J?) c X*(JT). 
Also the coalition-games with strictly bounded cooperation were already in-
vestigated, namely in the 7th section of this paper. The stable configurations in 
coalition-games with strictly bounded cooperation fulfil the statement of the follow-
ing Theorem. 
Theorem 10.2. Let the considered coalition-game f = (I, K, v) be a game with 
strictly bounded cooperation, and let Jt e K be the coalition structure, for which any 
j f e K is a subpartition of Jt. Then the imputation x forms a stable configuration 
with some coalition structure X e K, if and only if x forms a rational configuration 
with Jt; in symbols 
U X*(X) = X*(Jt) = {x e X(Jt) : (Jt, x) is rational} . 
XzK 
Proof. Let us denote B = {X e K : A(X) = 0}. Then, by Theorem 7.1, 
0 * B = S = K$={X : X v(K) = £ i>(./)jor a// / e K} . 
It means, that ^// e B, and, by Theorem 8.2, 
U X*(X) = **( ,# ) . 
XsK 
X*(Ji) = { X 6 I ( J ) : X x ; = »(X) for all K e <&(Ji)} 
ieK 
where 
%(jt) = u x, 
JfeK 
(c.f. Remark 8.2). 
It means, by Remark 3.2, that 
X*(Jl) = {x e X(^/) : (Jt, x) is rational} . 
11. BARGAINING SOLUTION AND CORE 
The concept of Core is well-known and often used in the coalition-games theory. 
It is interesting for us to verify, if, and how, corresponds our model of bargaining 
with that important notion. 
If r = (I, K, v) is a coalition-game then the Core of the game f is the following 
set of imputations 
C = {x = (x,.);e/ : x e Z( j f ) /or some Jf e K , £ x, > »(K) /or all Kef] J f } . 
The correspondence between the Core and the Bargaining Solution exists and 
it is very strong. 
Theorem 11.1. Let E = (I, K, D) be a coalition-game, let C be the Core of F, and 
let us denote by B the class of all coalition structures with empty value of domination 
structure A, B = {jf e K : A(Jf) = 0}. Then the Core is non-empty, if and only 
if there exists at least one coalition structure with empty value of domination struc-
ture, and, moreover, any imputation x belongs to the core, if and only if it forms 
a stable configuration with some coalition structure from B; in symbols 
C = 0 iff B = 0 , 
C = 0 X*(jf) # 0 iff B / 0 . 
JfeB 
Proof. Let C = 0. Then for any 
x e U X(JT) 
XeK 
there exists a coalition K e {M : M e Ji, Ji e K}, such that 
v(K) > I x; . 
ieK 
It means that there exists a real vector y = (y^)ieK such that 
Y, }'i = »(K), V; > X-, for all ieK. 
isK 
In this situation, either K e {M : M e Ji, Ji e Kef} or K e {M : M e Ji for some 
Ji e K} — {M : M e Jt for some Ji e Kef}, and then for any such y = (}',),EK there 
exists a coalition J e {M : M e Ji for some Ji e Kef}, such that J c X 
»(J) > Z V; > Z xi • 
ieJ ieJ 
Consequently, if C = 0 then for any 
x 6 U A'(JT) 
XeK 
there exists Le [M : M e Ji for some Ji e Kef}, such that 
<L) > X A-,. . 
By Lemma 5.1 (and its Corollary), there exists no J e K such that A(jf) = 0. 
It means that B = 0. 
Let C 4= 0. Then there exists 489 
x e IJ X{#) 
such that 
X x ; ^ v(K) for all K 6 IJ -S? => U -? • 
ieK ífeK í?eKef 
Lemma 5.1 implies that there exists , f e K such that A(.Jf) — 0, and, consequently, 
B 4= 0-
If x e C, then, by the previous step of this proof, there exists .yT e K such that 
(jf, x) is stable, so that X e S = B and xeX*(.5f). According to Theorem 8.2, 
x 6 X*(&) for all Jz? £ L; it means that 
C c f | X*(.3f) . 
jTeB 
If x £ C then there exists K e {M : M e Jl for some Jl e K}, such that 
(11.1) v(K)>lxt. 
!EK 
In the previous part of this proof, we have shown that (11 A) is true also for at least 
one Le{M : M e Jl for some J e K c r } , and by Lemma 5.1 (and its Corollary), 
if Jf e B and x e I ( X ) then x £ x* ( j r ) . It means that C => X*(jf). Theorem 8.2 
implies that 
C => n X*(JT). 
JTsB 
CONCLUSIVE COMMENTS 
The method, described in this work, enables us to find out the stable coalition 
structures and corresponding configurations in the following way. 
First of all we construct the sets X(c/C) for any coalition structure d" e K (c.f. 
(2.1)), and then we find all coalition structures, being effective from below, effective 
from above, and effective. 
Then we find out for any J f e Kef and for any class M <= Kef - {c€}, whether 
Jf u M or Jf non a M . 
After that, we construct the mapping A, i.e. the sets /l(jf) for all Jf e Kef, and we 
find the classes 
S and S n K e f , 
using Definitions and Theorems, introduced in the 5th Section, respectively also the 
Theorems, introduced in the 6th or 7th Section. 
Finally, we find out the set of coalitions 2I(Jf) and the set of imputations X*{X) 
(c.f. (8.3) and (8.4)) for any 
Results, obtained by the proposed method include the concept of Core, as their 
special case. Moreover, it is not difficult to verify that for 3-persons coalition-games 
the results, obtained by this method, correspond with the results, introduced in [3]. 
The correspondence between our results, i.e. our Bargaining Solution, and the 
intuitive idea of the rational bargaining result, was discussed in the Section 9. 
(Received November 18, 1972.) 
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